"A PICTURE HELD US CAPTIVE":
CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION AND THE LEMON TEST
WILLIAM

B. PETERSENt

The very way in which a concept is defined and the nuance
in which it is employed already embody to a certain degree a
prejudgment concerning the outcome of the chain of the
ideas built upon it.
Karl Mannheim'
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it,
for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it
to us inexorably.
Ludwig Wittgenstein 2
According to Raoul Berger, "[rligorous constitutional analysis
[often] halts at the door of particular predilections." 3 This tendency is
perhaps best illustrated by those cases involving the religion clauses of
the first amendment." Since 1971, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
establishment clause through the application of a three-part test it first
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman:5 "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the

statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' "6

This Comment argues that the first part of the Lemon test, the
purpose criterion, should be eliminated. Attempts to determine purpose-both in the historical sense of the "Framers' intent" and with
respect to contemporary legislation-are meaningless and lead the
Court to assume a causal relationship between purpose and effects that
t B.A. 1981, Ursinus College; M. Div. 1984, Yale Divinity School; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
I K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 177 (L. Wirth & E. Shils trans. 1952).
2 L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 115 (G. Anscombe
trans. 1958).
s R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 411 (1977).
' The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
5 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
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resulting confusion distorts the Court's
Comment proposes that the Court exfrom the chains of a potentially spuriand effects.
OVERVIEW

Early establishment clause cases reflected the Supreme Court's
view that religion and theism (of the Judeo-Christian variety) were one
and the same; the Court showed little tolerance for other forms of religious expression.' More recent cases in this area have avoided this earlier parochialism.' Fowler v. Rhode Island9 foreshadowed the contemporary Court's approach to the religion clauses when Justice Douglas
stated that "it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of
the First Amendment."'" As Laurence Tribe has noted, however,
"[w]hile the Court has . . . abandoned the narrow and conventional

view of religion reflected in an earlier period, it has not wholly escaped
the necessity of drawing some boundary around religion.""
Some Americans are displeased with the boundaries that the Court
has drawn around religion. They contend that the Court's tolerance
towards all forms of belief (and disbelief) represents a covert hostility
towards traditional American values. 2 Because attitudes towards reli7 See, e.g., The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890) (stating that the Mormon Church's practice of
polygamy was "a blot on our civilization. . . . [and] a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world").
8 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340, 343-44 (1970) (granting
conscientious objector status to a petitioner even though he did not believe in a "Supreme Being").
9 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
10 Id. at 70.
u L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 830 (1978).
12 Critics of the Court's approach in this area often invoke Justice Douglas' statement that Americans "are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Richard John Neuhaus has
offered a sophisticated criticism of the Court's approach to religion since Zorach. He
argues:
[a]s time went on [after Zorach] . . . the Court's references to religion had
less and less to do with what is usually meant by religion. That is, religion
no longer referred to those communal traditions of ultimate beliefs and
practices ordinarily called religion. Religion, in the court's meaning, became radically individualized and privatized. Religion became a synonym
for conscience. . . . Thus [for the Court] religion is no longer a matter of
• . . communal values but of individual conviction. In short, it is no longer
a public reality and therefore cannot interfere with public business.
Such a religious evacuation of the public square cannot be sustained,
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gion generate deep emotions, decisions in this area will always be controversial, and the thin line between the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment guarantees that the Court will never be
able to adopt an approach that yields obvious and predictable results. 3
The Lemon test appears to compartmentalize the factors that are
dispositive in establishment clause cases and hints at precision in both
analysis and outcome. Yet Chief Justice Burger, the author of Lemon,
was not sanguine about the test's ability to clarify establishment clause
interpretation: "Candor compels acknowledgment. . . that we can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive
either in concept or in practice. When religion in any traditional or recognizable form is excluded from the public square, it does not mean that the
public square is in fact naked. . . . When recognizable religion is excluded, the vacuum will be filled by ersatz religion, by religion bootlegged
into public space under other names.
R.

NEUHAUS, THE NAKED
AMERICA 80 (1984).

PUBLIC SQUARE:

RELIGION

AND

DEMOCRACY

IN

Neuhaus' assertion that the "public square" can never be naked has much to support it. As Vilfredo Pareto's analysis suggests, while elites rise and fall, a society cannot
exist without an operating ideology. Changes in elites are brought about by a loss of
faith in the operating ideology. See V. PARETO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ELITES
36-41 (1986). Neuhaus' conclusion, if accepted, reduces the phrase "government neutrality" to an oxymoron.
Less insightful critics have oversimplified the Court's position in attempts to make
it appear unreasonable and unfair. Pat Robertson, the fundamentalist preacher-turnedpresidential candidate, has distorted the Court's position in an attempt to rally voters.
For example, he stated that Virginia school children could not bring Christmas cookies
to school because their teachers were afraid that this activity was unconstitutional.
When reporters were unable to verify this story, Robertson dismissed them as "too
literal." See On the Grapevine, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 19.
Phillip E. Johnson has pointed out that:
[t]he Supreme Court seems at times to treat any government assistance to
religious activities as a forbidden establishment, yet at other times, it requires governments to take extraordinary measures to accommodate unusual religious practices. Despite the most determined efforts of the Justices and the scholars, no single logical framework seems capable of
explaining the law (citations omitted).
Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1984).
Although the Lemon test has become the interpretative approach to establishment
clause cases, there have been a few exceptions. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 786-92 (1983) (employing an historical analysis rather than the Lemon test in
deciding that the Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice did not violate the establishment clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (declining to apply the
Lemon test in declaring that the Minnesota legislature's Charitable Solicitations Act
violated the establishment clause because Lemon was "intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions . . .that discriminate
among religions" (citations omitted)). According to one commentator, "[t]he Lemon test
is not novel, but rather a deliberate synthesis of the teaching of earlier precedent."
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in EstablishmentClause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT.L.
REV. 83, 129 (1986).
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area of constitutional law." 14 Other members of the Court have also
lacked confidence in the test: Justice O'Connor has argued that the test
should be modified,' 5 and Chief Justice Rehnquist has written bluntly
that "[t]he three-part [Lemon] test has simply not provided adequate
standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has
slowly come to realize."' 6 Many scholars are no kinder to the Lemon
7
test.
While criticism of the Lemon test will continue, it appears that it
will not be readily abandoned by a majority of the Court. As Justice
Brennan has stated, the test is the Court's "settled method of analyzing
Establishment Clause cases." 8 This "settled method," however, has
had an unsettling impact on the outcome of establishment clause cases.
Jesse Choper argues that the "application of the Court's three-prong
test has generated ad hoc judgments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis." 9 Choper attributes this "conceptual
chaos" to the Lemon test's third criterion, which addresses the question
of "entanglement." 2 Yet a careful examination of the assumptions underlying the Lemon analysis reveals that to a greater extent its attempt
to determine purpose is what has led to conceptual chaos.
II.

THE PROBLEMS WITH PURPOSE

Wittgenstein was correct when he wrote that "[a] main source of
our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of
the use of our words."'" Under the Lemon test, the Court attempts to
determine purpose, seemingly unaware of the quagmire it has entered.
The Court's hunts for purpose fall into two groups, historical and contemporary, and appeals are made to both. For example, in Wallace v.
' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Time did not improve the Chief Justice's confidence
in the test; indeed, in 1983, he declined to apply it in Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-92.
15 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
1 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Chief
Justice Rehnquist was an Associate Justice at the time).
17 See, e.g., Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religious Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViLL. L. REV. 3, 17-23 (1978)
(arguing that the three-prong test hardly elucidates the Court's judgments); see also
Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1645
(1987) ("[A]pplying the Lemon formulation to public sphere accommodations is problematic, because it yields fundamentally ambiguous results.").
18 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrT-r. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980).
20 See id. at 681.
1 L. WITTGENSTEIN,

supra note 2, at § 122.
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Jaffree,22 a recent school prayer case, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the original intent of the Framers in order to determine purpose,2 3 while Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, focused on the
legislative history of the statute.2 4 Not surprisingly, the two approaches
to purpose yield different outcomes. But does either really determine
purpose?
A. Purpose and Original Intent
Establishment clause cases seem to demand original intent arguments. Many of the Framers and other Founding Fathers wrote on the
subject.25 The famous "wall" metaphor, first used in Everson v. Board
of Education,26 was taken from Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. 27 Arguments in favor of eroding, if not destroying, this
wall have also appealed to the original intent of the Framers.2 8 Chief
Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist have relied heavily on
original intent arguments when discussing establishment clause cases.29
Justice Brennan has also appealed to the original intent of the Framers, but with far different results than those of the two Chief Justices."
Taken together, these widely varying approaches illustrate why appeals
to original intent are methodologically unsound.
For Chief Justice Burger, both original intent and tradition determine the outcome of most establishment clause cases. Tradition bridges
the gap in time between the Framers' era and the present. In Lynch v.
Donnelly,31 for example, the Chief Justice argued that "[t]here is an
unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
See id. at 91-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 56-61.
25 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace faithfully documents the pertinent
primary writings from this period. See id. at 91-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State.'" (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))).
27 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
28 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he greatest
injury of the 'wall' notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights.").
29 See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
o See, e.g., Abingtorr School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232-42 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (using the Framers' intent for guidance to deal with the
problems of the twentieth century without becoming "too literal" in interpreting that
intent); see also infra text accompanying notes 38-41 (discussing Justice Brennan's
position).
31 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
22

23
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1789. ' ' 32 If these "historical patterns"33 have become "part of the fabric
of our society,"3' 4 then they are constitutional. Accordingly, even an
overtly religious activity, if supported by original intent and tradition,
does not violate the establishment clause; instead, it is "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country."35

Chief Justice Rehnquist's unadulterated appeal to original intent
is most clearly visible in his dissent in Wallace,36 which reads like an
essay on history. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, establishment
clause confusion has not been caused by any ambiguity in the Constitution itself, but by the Court's failure to heed the original intent of the
Framers. "As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the
principles that control today. Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will only lead to the type of
unprincipled decision-making that has plagued our Establishment
Clause cases since Everson."3 For Chief Justice Rehnquist then, original intent alone, unmediated by tradition, is the standard for establishment clause interpretation.
Justice Brennan, who has far less faith in original intent than
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, nevertheless believes that original
intent offers some interpretative help in this area. While he states that
"an awareness of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers do not always resolve concrete problems," 3 he believes that
by focusing on the consequences of what the "Framers deeply
feared," 9 the Framers can give the Court guidance. Of course, to
staunch supporters of original intent, Justice Brennan's approach only
uses the Framers as a springboard into an interpretative approach free
from intent. Justice Brennan admits that "[a] too literal quest for the
advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to
me futile and misdirected." 4 He argues that the original intent of the
Framers was not to ossify particulars for all time, but instead to discourage "interdependence between religion and state." 4 '
How much help is original intent in this area? How much does it
Id. at 674.
11 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
34 Id. at 792.
32

35

Id.

See 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38
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tell us about purpose? The most obvious problem with original intent is
that history seemingly can be shaped to fit the demands of a particular
argument. 2 As Justice Brennan states, often "the historical record is at
best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either
side of [a] proposition."4 History easily becomes the servant of a par44
ticular end since it is not a science that produces objective results.
Justice Brennan's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's sharply different understandings of the Framers' intent vividly illustrate this problem.
Even if history could produce objective results, however, original
intent jurisprudence would not be without its problems. Proponents of
original intent are faced with a more subtle but far more serious issue.
For even if history could tell us the Framers' positions, it does not tell
us the meaning of the text they wrote. Proponents of original intent are
guilty of "the intentional fallacy": they mistakenly believe that the author's intention reveals the meaning of a text.4 5
The Framers' opinions and beliefs are relevant only to the extent
that they reveal the meaning of the Constitution; however, their
thoughts tell us little, if anything, about methods of constitutional interpretation. Supporters of original intent incorrectly read the Constitution flatly, ignoring both the roles of time and the reader in the interpretative process. This hermeneutical stance has become untenable.
According to the literary critic Jonathan Culler,
[a]t its most basic the lesson of contemporary European criticism is this: the

. .

.

dream of a self-contained encounter be-

tween innocent reader and autonomous text is a bizarre fiction. To read is always to read in relation to other texts, in
relation to the codes that are the products of these texts and
41 See, e.g., L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION

299 (1988) ("The Justices tend to reason backward ....
They reach results first and
then find reasons, precedents, and historical support."). Levy goes on to observe that
"[t]wo centuries of Court history should bring us to understand what really is a notorious fact: the Court has flunked history." Id. at 300.
43 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44

See, e.g., G.

IGGERS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 3

(1975) ("Since before Nietzsche's essay on 'The Use and Abuse of History' doubts have
increasingly been expressed not only regarding the utility of history to life but regarding the possibility of a science of history . . . ."); S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING
UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 25 (D. Swenson & W. Lowrie trans. 1974) ("[FIor nothing
is more readily evident than that the greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything historical is merely an approximation.").
41 See W. WIMSATT & M. BEARDSLEY, THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE
MEANING OF POETRY 3-18 (1954) (The "design or intention of the author is neither
available nor desirable as the standard for judging the success of a work of literary art
. ... "); see also Wimsatt & Beardsley, Intention, in DICTIONARY OF WORLD LITERATURE

327 (J. Shipley ed. 1953) (same).
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go to make up a culture.4
Textual interpretation can never be a mere historical reconstruction. A text's meaning does not spring directly from the text, nor does it
spring solely from the reader's mind. Meaning comes from the meeting
between text and reader. The reader brings her preconditions, her
"prejudices," in Gadamer's special use of the word,4' to all texts. This
"intertextuality" between reader and text signifies that texts are always
media of interpretation.48 Even if the thoughts of the Framers and the
meaning of the Constitution were identical (which they are not), a flat,
"literal" reading of the document would not produce the intent of the
Framers.
A text such as the Constitution, which reflects the rules and values
of a community, is a "lens[] through which human beings see and respond to their changing worlds . . . . ,
The pristine world of the
Framers can never be recreated, and even if it could, it would fail to
disclose meaningful answers. As Gadamer correctly writes, "a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruction of the original would be no more than the recovery of a dead meaning.""
B.

Purpose and Legislative Intent
1. Whose Intent Matters?

The second type of purpose hunt involves legislative history. Some
members of the Court look first to the intent of the authors and supporters of legislation to determine whether or not legislation is constitutional. An excellent example of this approach to purpose can be found
J. CULLER, THE PURSUIT OF SIGNS: SEMIOTICS, LITERATURE, DECONSTRUCTION 11-12 (1981).
47 See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 239-45 (1986) ("[Plrejudice means a
judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been
finally examined ....
Thus 'prejudice' certainly does not mean a false judgment, but
it is part of the idea that it can have a positive and a negative value.").
48 The concept of intertextuality and the notion that texts are always media of
interpretation are to a certain extent the insights of deconstruction. For an introduction
to this diverse literary approach, see generally, C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982). "A . . . reversal of priorities occurs in the deconstructive
reading of 'literary' texts. There is no longer a sense of a primal authority attaching to
the literary work and requiring that criticism keeps its respectful distance." Id. at 24.
While I find this terminology useful, I reject many of deconstruction's more radical
conclusions, including the suggestion that this intertextuality reduces interpretation to a
completely subjective process.
4'

49 G. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A
POSTLIBERAL AGE

50 H.

83 (1984).
supra note 47, at 149.
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in Wallace,51 where the Court was faced with an unusual situation
described in Justice Stevens' majority opinion: "After reviewing at
length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the
District Court concluded that 'the establishment clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state
from establishing a religion.' ",52
To decide Wallace, Justice Stevens turned to the statute itself, applied the Lemon test,5" and then ascertained the statute's purpose by
examining its legislative history. He concluded that "[tihe State did not
5' 4
present evidence of any secular purpose.
The legislative history behind the Alabama statute was seemingly
clear: the statute's sponsor stated for the record that the legislation's
purpose was an attempt to return "voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. 55 Since there was no evidence that the statute had any secular
purpose, Justice Stevens found the statute unconstitutional without ex56
amining the remaining two criteria of the Lemon test.
While Justices Powell and O'Connor agreed with Justice Stevens
that the Alabama statute had a solely religious purpose, both had reservations about his reliance on the statement of the statute's sponsor. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the sponsor's testimony was given during a preliminary injunction hearing and, in light of this, she "would
give little, if any, weight to this sort of evidence of legislative intent.""
Justice Powell agreed with Justice O'Connor, stating that "a single legislator's statement, particularly if made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose."5 8
2.

Can Legislative History be Trusted?

The concurrences of Justices Powell and O'Connor in Wallace
only hint at the problems that come from equating purpose with legislative history. As with original intent, the question of whose intent
counts becomes an important and disputed question. In Edwards v.
Aguillard,59 a recent case involving a statute that was invalidated on
the basis of Lemon's purpose analysis, Justice Scalia strongly attacked
51 See 472 U.S. at 45. In Wallace, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent strongly appealed to original intent. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
52 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 45.

8' See id. at 55-56.
54 Id. at 57.

" See id.

56

See id. at 56.

5' Id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5"8Id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring).

59 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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the relationship between legislative history and the purpose criterion."0
' which prohibited
Aguillard involved Louisiana's "Creationism Act," 61
the teaching of evolution unless "creation science" was also taught.62
On its face, the stated purpose of the Louisiana statute was secular: to "protect academic freedom." 6 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, admitted that the words "protect academic freedom" might,
"in common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the freedom of teachers to teach what they will."6 4 Yet he concluded that this
stated purpose was a "sham" and that "[i]t is . . . clear that requiring

schools to teach creation science with evolution does not advance academic freedom."' 65 The statute was therefore held to be unconstitutional
on the grounds that it violated the purpose criterion of the Lemon test:
the stated purpose of the statute hid an unconstitutional religious
purpose.6 6
How did Justice Brennan reach this conclusion? He examined the
public statements of the statute's sponsors. The state senator who introduced the statute admitted that he wished that neither creation science
nor evolution was taught in public schools. 6" Other legislators stated
that they supported the statute for religious reasons. 68 In light of these
statements, Justice Brennan concluded that the stated purpose of the
statute was not its genuine purpose.6 9
Justice Brennan in Aguillard approached legislative purpose in
much the same way as did Justice Stevens in Wallace.7 0 Both Justices
were confident that they could determine legislative intent from a statSee id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982). Part of the Statute's nondiscrimination

60
61

REV.

requirement states:

public schools within this state shall give balanced treatment to creationscience and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment to these two models
shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials
taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that
such lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in
any way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the
universe.
Id. at § 17:286.4A.
62 See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 580-82.
63 Id. at 586.
6 Id.
65

Id. at 587.

68 See id.
17 See id.

See id. at 590-93.
'9 See id.

6I

70

See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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ute's legislative history and both looked beyond the officially stated legislative purpose to statements 7" of the statute's sponsors.7 2 Chief Justice
Burger, dissenting in Wallace, argued that the majority was wrong to
impugn the motives of the Alabama legislature.7 3 The sponsor's testimony, on which the majority greatly relied, was "made after the legislature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that the Court finds
critical was given well over a year after the statute was enacted. ' 4 He
asserted that there was "not a shred of evidence that the legislature as a
whole shared the sponsor's motive or that a majority in either house
was even aware of the sponsor's view of the bill when it passed."' 5
Chief Justice Burger's dissent raises a disconcerting issue: when
the Court attempts to determine legislative intent, which statements are
relevant, and how much weight should each be given? In both Wallace
and Aguillard, some of the Justices were uneasy with the way the majority ascertained legislative purpose.76 Justice Scalia, in his dissent in
Aguillard,7 strongly objected to the majority's decision to allow the
case to be dismissed on summary judgment grounds: "[T]he question of
. . . [the Act's] constitutionality cannot rightly be disposed of on the
7
gallop, by impugning the motives of its supporters."1
Justice Brennan, in a footnote to his majority opinion, criticized
Justice Scalia's use of legislative history: "[I]t is astonishing that the
dissent, to prove its assertion, relies on a section of the legislation,
which was eventually deleted by the legislature."79 Justice Brennan,
sanguine that the Court could determine the statute's proper and correct purpose, confidently asserted that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of legislative purpose. "80
But the fact that the Justices themselves disagreed over the legitimate
7

See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 593; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59-60.

See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 593 ("The legislation . . . sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the
theory of evolution."); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59-60 ("We must, therefore, conclude that
the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law and that it was motivated by
the same purpose that the Governor's answer to the second amended complaint expressly admitted; that the statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and that
Senator Holmes' [the statute's sponsor] testimony frankly described. The legislature
enacted ... [the statute] for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of
72

prayer activities .

• See
Id.
"
Id.
71 See
71 See
78 Id.
79
80

. . ."

(citation omitted)).

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
at 86-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
supra notes 57-58 & 73-75 and accompanying text.
482 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588 n,8 (citation omitted).
Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
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parameters of legislative history should serve as a clear warning of that
history's unreliability.
The dispute over the proper role of legislative history, vividly illustrated in Aguillard and Wallace,"' can never be resolved because
the borders of legislative history cannot be clearly marked. As with
original intent, the most important factor in assessing legislative purpose is the predisposition of the person determining the statute's legislative history. As Justice Scalia has correctly noted, "[a]ll of these sources
. . . [of legislative history] are eminently manipulable." 82 Thus, the
majority in Aguillard, according to Justice Scalia, has forgotten an obvious point:
We cannot of course assume that every member present (if,
as is unlikely, we know who or even how many they were)
agreed with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's pre-enactment floor or committee statement. Quite obviously, "[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of
others to enact it."8 3
Even if the Court were able to agree on the proper sources of
legislative history, the problems with using this history for determining
purpose would remain. In addition to the problems of assessing which
statements properly express a statute's legislative purpose, and resisting
the temptation to equate these statements uncritically with the written
statute, 4 the Court must ascertain the veracity of a stated legislative
purpose. Should the Court assume that a state legislature acts in good
faith when it reports the "official" purpose of a statute?
In large part, the disagreement between Justices Brennan and
Scalia in Aguillard stems from different attitudes towards the Louisiana legislature. Justice Scalia was willing to accept that the legislature
acted in good faith when it stated the official purpose of the creationscience statute; Justice Brennan was not. The legislature was very deliberate in preparing its official purpose for the Creationism Act.85 Justice Brennan concluded that the stated purpose of "academic freedom"
was a pretense, carefully designed to avoid the limits of the establishSee supra notes 53-58 & 67-80 and accompanying text.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 384 (1968)).
' To equate author intent with the meaning of a written statute is as problematic
in the area of legislative intent as it is in the area of original intent. See supra notes 4550 and accompanying text.
88 See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 626-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8l
82
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ment clause.8 6 Justice Scalia concluded that the assiduous attention
given the Act's official purpose revealed a sincere respect for the constitutional boundaries.
Pinpointing the intent of legislatures is as difficult as assessing the
intent of the Framers. The question of whose intent should be dispositive is not easily answered and the process can be extremely subjective.8 8 Furthermore, by focusing on motive, the approach encourages
legislative hypocrisy. Zealous legislators may calibrate the proper "purpose" for statutes in the hope that they can avoid the constitutional
limits set by the Court.89
3.

Narrative Truth and Historical Truth

The confusion surrounding legislative intent does not spring only
from the cynicism of some legislators. On the contrary, even the most
earnest and conscientious legislators cannot always be certain of their
intentions. All historical recountings are to some extent interpretative in
nature. And these interpretations, according to the psychiatrist Donald
P. Spence, involve a "search for continuity and connection" 90 that incorporate two kinds of truths: narrative and historical.9" Spence defines
narrative truth as "the criterion we use to decide when a certain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it depends on continuity
and closure and the extent to which the fit of the pieces takes on an
aesthetic finality." 92
Since motivations are often ambivalent and manifold, Spence argues that in interpreting a past event, "it is more appropriate to think
of construction rather than reconstruction .

. . ."

Given this, well-

intended legislators will be predisposed to discount the conflicting motivations behind their legislative actions. They will confuse historical
See id. at 586-87; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Cf Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the Gerrymandering
Thicket after Davis v. Bademer, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 225-27 (1987) (demonstrating that tests to determine legislative intent of New Jersey moment of silence statute
were subjective).
89 See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also May v.
Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1563-65 (D.N.J. 1983) (tracing the attempts of the
New Jersey legislature to introduce school prayer through what appeared to be increasingly "secular" legislation).
88
87
88

80

D.

SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL TRUTH: MEANING AND

INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

91 See id. at 292-97.

280 (1982).

92 Id. at 31. Historical truth, in contrast, is "the way things were." Id. at 27.
Spence argues that the need to tell a coherent, understandable account tends to shift
people's stories "away from what 'really' happened." Id. at 28.
3

Id. at 288.
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truth with narrative truth, and the "coherence" of their account may
mislead them into thinking that they have made "contact with an actual
happening.""' ' Justice Scalia recognized this dynamic in his dissent in
Aguillard:
[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the
statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not
binary, or indeed even finite. In the present case

. .

.

a par-

ticular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster religion or because he wanted to
improve education. He may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make
amends with a faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill's
sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the
Majority Leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would
appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for
him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he
disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent
mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity
95

Because of these difficulties, Justice Scalia accepted the legislators'
stated legislative purpose of "academic freedom," 9 and concluded that
"those legislators who supported the

.

.

.Act in fact acted with a 'sin-

cere' secular purpose. " 97 His conclusion admits the limits of attempts to
determine purpose, but stops short of calling for a complete rejection of
the concept.
The Court can no more rely on legislative intent than it can on the
Framers' original intent. The parameters of legislative intent are nebulous, the Court's focus on intent encourages hypocrisy and evasion, and
even a well-intentioned legislator may confuse narrative truth with historical truth in the hopes of creating a coherent explanation for her
actions. Legislative intent does not yield a statute's purpose, but instead
offers only a melange of explanations-all pliable, all obvious, and all
extraneous.
94 Id.

at 27.
Aguilard, 482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 628-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

15

(stating that the Court should defer to an expression of secular purpose explicitly set
forth in the statute).
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III.

THE CONFUSION OF PURPOSE, EFFECTS, AND CAUSATION

Attempts to determine purpose not only are fruitless, but they can
lull members of the Court into two different, but equally insidious, assumptions: first, that purpose, by itself, can reveal the meaning of a
statute and; second, that a law enacted with a religious purpose will
necessarily have a religious effect. In turn, the results of these assumptions are confusing. The Court's sojourns into the realm of "purpose"
are in reality sojourns into the realm of "effects." This section examines how these erroneous assumptions influence the Court's reasoning
in establishment clause cases.
A. A Religious Purpose Does not Necessarily Lead to a Religious
Effect
In The Concept of Mind,98 Gilbert Ryle introduces the concept of
a "category-mistake" which "represents the facts of mental life as if
they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."99 Category-mistakes are
common, and they often involve seemingly harmless semantic issues.1 00
Yet according to Ryle, "[t]he theoretically interesting category-mistakes
are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are
still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical
98

G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).

9 Id. at 16. Ryle illustrates the concept as follows:
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a
number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks "But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not
yet seen . . . your University." It has then to be explained to him that the
University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart
to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University
is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When
they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University
has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that . . . "the
University" stood for an extra member of the class of which these other
units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the
same category as that to which the other institutions belong.

Id.
100 Even a small degree of imprecision in language can easily lead to significant
misunderstandings. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G. Anscombe & G. von
Wright eds., D. Paul & G. Anscombe trans. 1969) §§ 6-21 (pointing out that the
meaning of the expression "I know" varies from "I am certain" to "I feel," and discussing the implications of this imprecision); see also T. MORAWETZ, WITTGENSTEIN
& KNOWLEDGE 60-61 (1978) (noting that propositions have meaning by virtue of a
standard context, not meaning in themselves).
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types to which they do not belong."' '
Ryle's category-mistake describes the Court's use of purpose to
support conceptual relationships that the term cannot properly support.
In particular, the Court often incorrectly assumes a causal relationship
between the first two parts of the Lemon test, and concludes that a
religious purpose necessarily leads to a religious effect. Because of this
conceptual confusion, the Court often uses the term purpose when it
means effects. While this incorrect wording seems unimportant, it
clouds the Court's understanding of effects, which in turn greatly obscures the Court's analysis of the establishment clause.
The fundamental mistake in the Lemon analysis is its assumption
that a religious purpose, by itself, renders a statute unconstitutional. If
the Court were concerned with religious purpose alone, however, it
would be forced to declare many statutes unconstitutional solely because they coincide with religious beliefs. Choper is correct when he
writes that:
a set of values or beliefs does not become "religious" for purposes of the Establishment Clause simply because some people adopt[] them as their "religion." . . . If this were not
true, then laws against murder and theft would be unconstitutional because these legal prohibitions coincide with the
tenets of virtually every major religion in the world ...
The values that underlie the government action are not "religious" for the purpose of sterilizing the government from
acting in accordance with its own set of secularly oriented
beliefs.'" 2
Choper's argument seems almost self-evident. Yet under current
doctrine, if a legislator's religious motivation coincides with the secular
effect of a statute, that statute is automatically rendered unconstitutional under the Lemon test. The Court assumes that a religious purpose can never lead to a secular effect. This is incorrect. Legislation
often involves "religious" convictions on some level. Religious beliefs
can direct a legislator's attention to a problem, such as the lack of shelter for the homeless, or reconcile conflicting values when "shared premises and common forms of reasoning"' 3 will not suffice. Religion is
frequently present in the amalgam of factors that compel legislators to
o20
G. RYLE, supra note 98, at 17.
Choper, Church, State and the Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29
ARIZ. L. REV. 551, 557-58 (1987).
102

101 K.
(1988).

GREENAWALT,

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 250
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act and this presence does not render the legislation unconstitutional.
The Court has struck down statutes with religious purposes because it sees purposes and effects as necessarily interwoven. But a religious purpose is not a necessary cause of religious effects. 0 4 If it were,
then a religious purpose would result in an unconstitutional statute. If
this were true, then, as Choper points out, 10

5

many unquestionably

constitutional statutes would be unconstitutional. 6
While one of the common hallmarks of a cause and effect relationship is that a cause precedes an effect in time, not all temporal relationships are causal relationships.' 7 The Court sometimes confuses a temporal relationship with a causal relationship, however, and assumes
cause and effect because the religious purpose precedes the statute's effects. But a religious purpose can yield a secular effect, and a secular
purpose can yield a religious effect. Accordingly, there is no necessary
causal relationship between the first two criteria of the Lemon test.
For example, suppose a legislator believed that Shakespeare's
plays inculcated Christianity because she thought they depicted a world
ordered by a Christian cosmology. If for this reason she introduced legislation that required the plays of Shakespeare to be taught in every
high school, would this religious cause yield a religious effect? Absolutely not. The legislator's purpose is totally unrelated to its effect,
101 For purposes of this Comment, "cause" is defined as the condition or conditions necessary to produce a certain change; this change is the cause of the effects. That
is, if A exists, then B must also exist. If it rains, then the ground will be wet. This
definition of cause is a tremendous oversimplification. Hume's questions concerning
"necessary" causation can be found in D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 39-53 (E. Steinberg ed. 1977). See generally H. HART & A. HoNORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 26-30 (1959) (providing a general discussion of cause
and effect).
105 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108 The truth of this statement is illustrated by Thanksgiving, which is a national
holiday. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (a) (1982). The pilgrims clearly had a religious intent
when they conceived of Thanksgiving. See W. BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647, at 131-32 (S. Morison ed. 1952) ("[T]he Lord sent them such seasonable showers . . . as, through His blessing, caused a fruitful and liberal harvest
...[flor which mercy, in time convenient, they also set apart a day of thanksgiving.").
Thanksgiving, as it is observed by the majority of Americans, is no longer i primarily
religious happening. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 226
(1953) ("[T]he nationalist element [of Thanksgiving is] so dominant that it is closer to
Washington's Birthday or Independence Day than it is to a religious holiday."). Hence,
its proclamation is not unconstitutional.
107 Hart and Honore illustrate this point with the following example:
[I]f a man shoots at his wife intending to kill her, and she takes refuge in
her parents' house where she is injured by a falling tile, though we may
believe, on the strength of various general propositions, that if the man
had not shot at his wife she would not have been injured . . . this would
not justify the assertion that the man had caused his wife's injury . . ..
H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 104, at 11-12.
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which by consensus is secular. Because there is no necessary causation
between the first two criteria of the Lemon test, a violation of the first
criterion does not necessarily lead to a violation of the second.
What if some teachers in the state, aware of the statute's Christian
purpose, used the plays as a springboard to proselytize? This use, of
course, would be a violation of the establishment clause. Although the
statute's purpose has not changed, its effects has. The Shakespeare statute's constitutionality is determined by its effect and not by its purpose.
This category mistake-confusing purpose with effects-exists because
the Court mistakenly sees a causal relationship between purpose and
effect.
B.

Examples of Purpose-Effect Confusion

Because a religious purpose does not automatically produce a religious effect, statutes with no religious effect should be constitutional.
Thus, the Court should be focusing on effects and ignoring purpose
10 8
because purpose only obscures analysis.
According to Richard Taylor, "[a]ny adequate analysis of the
causal relation should enable one to distinguish analytically between
causes and effects. It should not obliterate the difference between
them."'0 9 When applying the Lemon test, the Court believes that it has
separated cause and effect when in fact it obliterates the differences
between them. While claiming to examine a statute's purpose, members
of the Court are often exploring its effects. For example, in his concurrence in Edwards v. Aguillard," ° Justice Powell wrote: "The Establishment Clause is properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible
and other religious documents in public school education only when the
purpose of the use is to advance a particular religious belief.""' But is
Justice Powell really concerned with purpose in this situation? His
statement would be more accurate if the word "effect" replaced the
word "purpose." Justice Powell has committed a "category mistake."
He says purpose when he means effects.
The purpose of the statute is only relevant to the extent that it can
reveal its effects. But since no necessary cause and effect relationship
exists between purpose and effect," 2 why not examine effects directly?
108 As the philosophers W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian have written, "[wie should
he wary of explanations that appeal to motives and character traits." W. QUINE & J.
ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 80 (1970).
109 Taylor, Causation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 56, 64 (1967).

110

482 U.S. 578 (1987).

111
112

Id. at 608 (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
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While Justice Powell emphasizes the role of purpose, he is actually
concerned with effects; "purpose of the use" is really just another way
to talk about effects.
Justice O'Connor also uses the word "purpose" when she means
"effects." In her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree,1 3 for example, she
-wrote that "[w]hile the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely
be determinative in striking down a statute it nevertheless serves an
important function. It reminds government that when it acts it should
do so without endorsing a particular religious belief ... 114 Like
Justice Powell, she stresses "acts"- which falls under the effects criterion, not the purpose criterion. Government "acts" are the effects of an
antecedent cause. Whether or not this cause was religious is irrelevant;
what is important is that the act itself not endorse a particular religious
belief.
For the reasons discussed above," 5 if the Court insists on continuing to use the first criterion of Lemon, perhaps Justice Frankfurter's
understanding of purpose, in an opinion written ten years before
Lemon, works best: "To ask what interest, what objective, legislation
serves, of course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine
the necessary effects of what they have enacted." ' 6 For Justice Frankfurter, a statute's objective, or purpose, is determined by its effects.
While he too is guilty of assuming a causal relationship between purpose and effects, Justice Frankfurter at least focuses his discussion on
effects, and not purpose.
C.

The Purpose Criterion Taints the Court's Analysis of Effects

Attempts to determine religious purpose offer little chance of success. Indeed, when applying the Lemon test, the Court usually examines purpose cursorily; since the Court first adopted the Lemon test, it
has only twice invalidated a statute on the basis of the purpose criterion."' According to Justice Scalia, "[a]lmost invariably, we [the
Court] have effortlessly discovered a secular purpose for measures challenged under the Establishment Clause, typically devoting no more
than a sentence or two to the matter." 1 8 At best, the first criterion of
the Lemon test is superfluous, although it also has a more nefarious
113 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
114

Id. at 75-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
117 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
118 Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
11
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influence: its false causation taints the Court's analysis of a statute's
effects.
By allowing purpose to dictate effects, the Lemon test narrows the
Court's understanding of effects. The Court tends to examine effects
through the lens of purpose. Thus, in Aguillard, a majority of the
Court gave the statute's sponsor the power to dictate its effects. This
approach ossifies effects, and does not properly appreciate the contextual nature of religious meaning.
Meaning is determined by use. 19 as Wittgenstein's study of language illustrates.1 20 He warns about misunderstanding meaning by assuming that it exists in an objective state, free from the influence of
community decisions, thoughts, and beliefs. 2'
For the events and symbols examined by establishment clause
cases, Wittgenstein's understanding of meaning points out an obvious
problem with the Lemon test: the relationship between the first two
criteria leads the Court to assume that the meaning of a religious event
or symbol is predetermined and fixed. Purpose claims to grasp a statute's effects, its meaning in the community, before the group has been
exposed to the statute. But as Wittgenstein argues, meaning does not
develop in this way; rather, meaning is determined by group experience, by a form of life. 22
119 Cf L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 138 ("[W]e understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it.").
120See L. WrrTGENSTEIN, supra note 100, at § 61 ("A meaning of a word is a
kind of employment of it"). Wittgenstein states that:
There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression's meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which
one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice. That is why one
repeats the expression to oneself so often, because it is as if one must see
what one is looking for in the expression and in the feeling it gives one.
Id. at § 601.
121 Wittgenstein's insights into language also apply to general epistemological issues, and his understanding of language as symbols of meaning can be applied to a
statute's effects. We arrive at knowledge from experience; an object's meaning is determined by group consensus, what Wittgenstein calls a "form of life." See L. WITGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 241 ("'So you are saying that human agreement decides
what is true and what is false?'-It is what human beings say that is true and false;
and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form
of life.").
122 Events and symbols that involve religion are especially sensitive to forms of
life. Wittgenstein was aware of this problem. In a forward for a book that was not
published in his lifetime, he wrote the following:
I would like to say "This book is written to the glory of God", but
nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in good will, and in so far as it is not
so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is
free of them.
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The power of a religious symbol depends on this form of life. Activities and objects can either lose or gain their religious symbolism.
The Christmas tree is an excellent example of this change in a religious
object's symbolic power. Unlike the public display of a creche, which
leads to complaints and lawsuits, many view the Christmas tree as an
innocuous, non-religious symbol. Yet the Christmas tree was once a
powerful symbol of Christianity.2 3 that has since lost its religious content.12 According to the theologian Paul Tillich,
[a] religious symbol is true if it adequately expresses the correlation of some person with final revelation. A religious
symbol can die . . . if the correlation of which it is an adequate expression dies. This occurs whenever the revelatory
situation changes and former symbols become obsolete. The
history of religion, right up to our own time, is full of dead
symbols. 2 5
Does a Christmas tree differ from a creche? Given public awareness and sensitivity to the presence of a creche in a public place, probably so. But this assessment cannot be made before the creche meets the
community12 6 or by examining purposes; it can only be determined
through an exploration of a form of life. Justice Brennan correctly
stated in Abington School District v. Schempp 12 7 that a religious symbol, such as "In God We Trust" on currency, has been interwoven "so
L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS, Foreword (R. Hargreaves & R. White

trans. 1975).
Wittgenstein's Foreword illustrates the problems of a religious symbol in transition. The phrase, "glory to God," which once conveyed a religious affirmation, has lost
this original meaning. But it has not yet been completely secularized, and so cannot
clearly convey Wittgenstein's intended meaning-good will. As much as Wittgenstein
wished otherwise, a form of life still determined the phrase's meaning, and this form of
life had not completely secularized the phrase.
123 See, e.g., W. WALSH,
CURIOSITIES OF POPULAR CUSTOMS AND OF RITES,
CEREMONIES, OBSERVANCES, AND MISCELLANEOUS ANTIQUriIES 241-42 (1907) (one
legend identifies Martin Luther as its originator, while another credits St. Winfrid with
starting the custom as a symbol of peace, everlasting life, and the Christ-child).
124 Meaning for the Christmas tree has come and gone before. Theories regarding
its ultimate origin point to Norse mythology, practices of the Roman Saturnalia, ancient Egyptian winter solstice observances, and Chanukah. See id. at 242-43.
P' TILLICH, I SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 240 (1951).
p.
128 This is not to say that courts may never determine whether a statute violates
the establishment clause until after the statute has taken effect. Courts routinely judge
the impact of events before they have occurred in cases involving injunctive relief. Federal courts may grant a temporary restraining order on a showing "that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant .

. . ."

FED. R. Civ. P.

65(b) (emphasis added). In granting injunctions in establishment clause cases, as at
other times, the court should predict the effect of the future occurrence on the applicant, and not analyze the state of mind of the adverse party.
127 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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deeply into the fabric of our civil polity that its present use may well
not present that type of involvement which the First Amendment prohibits."1 2 Justice Brennan's statement shows a great sensitivity to the
nature of religious objects and actions, since it does not attempt to preordain their meaning. Nor does it make any causal assumptions between purpose and effects, or confuse the two. Not surprisingly, his
statement preceded Lemon.
Perhaps more than any other aspect of Constitutional law, establishment clause jurisprudence depends on an understanding of forms of
life in order to generate clear analysis. As Robert Cover has argued,
"[t]he religion clauses of the Constitution seem to me unique in the
clarity with which they presuppose a collective, norm-generating community ...

.""'

By applying the first criterion of the Lemon test, the

Court has not shown the same appreciation of the importance of the
"collective, norm-generating community."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Lemon test sets a purpose threshold in front of all establishment clause examinations. But purpose cannot be discovered; neither
original intent nor legislative intent are available to the Court. Even if
they were, they would not help the Court to decide establishment clause
cases, since the purpose of the Framers or of state legislators does not
reveal the meaning of the Constitution or of statutes.
Purpose also has a nefarious influence on all attempts to determine effects. The Court confuses cause with effect and assumes a necessary causal relationship that does not exist. Because it cannot explore
effects free from purpose, the Court assumes further that the meaning
of a religious object or action pre-exists, and has an objective status that
does not change. This supposition clouds the Court's understanding of
context and its relationship to effects. Consequently, the Court does not
recognize the way the meaning of a religious symbol or event should be
assessed. Only through a study of a form of life can meaning be determined; and only through a study of effects, unfettered by purpose, can
a form of life be understood.
The Lemon test does not function properly because it stands on a
faulty philosophical foundation. Its simple three-step process hides confusion about interpretation, causation, and even epistemology. Undoubtedly, some want to retain Lemon and skirt the abstract issues that
Id. at 303 (Brennan, J. concurring).
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 n.94 (1983).
128

129

19891

CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

1849

lie behind its facade. But in an increasingly complex, pluralistic society,
the Court cannot ignore these abstract, seemingly remote, problems.
For as Justice Holmes once wrote: "[a]lthough practical men generally
prefer to leave their major premises inarticulate, yet even for practical
purposes theory generally turns out the most important thing in the
30
end.,,L

130 Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420
(1898-99).

